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DDAS Accident Report
Accident details
Report date: 19/07/2011

Accident number: 777

Accident time: 08:10

Accident Date: 31/07/2007

Where it occurred: AF/1303/13206,
MF0002, Chashma
Jungan Village, Dahnai
Ghori District, Baghlan
Province
Primary cause: Inadequate training (?)
Class: Excavation accident

Country: Afghanistan

Secondary cause: Management/control
inadequacy (?)
Date of main report: None

ID original source: (23)

Name of source: UNMACCA

Organisation: [Name removed]
Mine/device: AP blast (unrecorded)

Ground condition: not recorded
Date last modified: 19/07/2011

Date record created:
No of victims: 1

No of documents: 1

Map details
Longitude:

Latitude:

Alt. coord. system: Not recorded

Coordinates fixed by:

Map east:

Map north:

Map scale:

Map series:

Map edition:

Map sheet:

Map name:

Accident Notes
inadequate investigation (?)
Inadequate detector pinpointing
squatting/kneeling to excavate (?)
use of pick (?)
visor not worn or worn raised (?)
handtool may have increased injury (?)
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Accident report
The only report of this accident that has been made available to date is a UNMACCA Lessons
Learned document. Its conversion into a DDAS file has led to some of the original formatting
being lost. Text in square brackets [ ] is editorial. This record will be revised if more
information becomes available.
The document is reproduced below, edited for anonymity.

LESSONS LEARNED SUMMARY OF DEMINING ACCIDENT OCCURRED ON [Demining
group] - 08 ON 31 JULY, 2007
INTRODUCTION:
An investigation team was convened by the Area Manager of AMAC Northeast (Kundoz) to
investigate the demining accident involving [the Victim] a deminer from [Demining group]- 08.
The accident occurred at 08:10 hours on 23 July 2007 at task # AF/1303/13206/ MF0002
located in Chashma Jungan village, Dahnai Ghori district of Baghlan province. The accident
resulted injuries to both hands of the victim deminer.
SUMMARY:
The mentioned task is part of SHA #4of impacted community#1001 which is contaminated by
AP mines. More than 10 accidents have happened in this area on locals. [Demining group]
team number 8 was busy working in the mentioned task. In one of the lane where [the Victim]
deminer was excavating the ground to locate a signal made by its detector, suddenly an
explosion happened and caused both hands injuries to him. As the deminer had worn the
PPE and Helmet with visor down, he did not receive more injuries to other parts of his body.
After receiving first aid the casualty was carried to Puli khomri public hospital for more
treatment.
CONCLUSIONS:
The following points were found by investigation team:
•

Poor command and control was dominated during the operation of the team, because
the deminer was working by pick with his visor up, but the command group of the
team failed to avoid him of doing such wrong practice.

•

According to team leader brief the team was working based on new concept of
operation, but they did not know what the new concept of operation is.

•

The report of LIS and the task order information clearly mention that the area is
contaminated by both AT and AP mine but the deminers of the team were not briefed
by team leader that which type of mine is expected in the task.

•

It is the second accident happened in this team since 13 February 2007 that clearly
shows lack of training and weak command and control of the command group.

RECOMMENDATIONS:
The following points are to be considered:
•

Retraining of the team is recommended with focusing on the proper excavation drill,
and the training is to be monitored by relevant AMAC.

•

The command group of the team is to enhance their control on deminers and avoid
them of using wrong tools and ignorance of standards.

2

•

The command group of the team must read completely and thoroughly all the
documents given by AMAC and make sure themselves of any misunderstanding,
then start their work based on a proper clearance plan.

•

The relevant supervisor/field officer should advise the command group of the teams
to brief their team members about the key information of the task and operation, prior
to commencement of actual daily operation.

•

A special training is to be conducted for command group of the team with focusing on
better control and manage of team activities as well as new concept of operation.

Victim Report
Victim number: 963

Name: [Name removed]
Gender: Male

Age:
Status: deminer

Fit for work: not known

Compensation: Not made available

Time to hospital: Not made available

Protection issued: Frontal apron

Protection used: Frontal apron; Long
visor

Long visor

Summary of injuries:
INJURIES: severe Hands
COMMENT: No Medical report was made available. ". . . injuries to both hands".

Analysis
The primary cause of this accident is listed as Inadequate training because the investigators
recommend that retraining of deminers and field supervisors was required. The secondary
cause is listed as a Management Control Inadequacy because failure to have provided
effective training and essential information about the task and the procedures to be used to
conduct it were significant management failings.
There is an apparent contradiction in the summary which reports that the Victim wore his PPE
and this limited his injuries, but also that the Visor was worn raised.
The “Inadequate investigation” listed under notes refers to the absence of a full accident
report. The UN supported MACCA has failed to make these widely available for some years,
so ignoring the requirements of the IMAS. It is noteworthy that the Afghan national staff have
been more responsible over sharing data than those internationals who presume greater
responsibility.
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